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R116resting length ofw50 nm, consistent
with a recent atomic force microscopy
study of isolated talin in vitro [10].
One important caveat in interpreting
these studies is that the technique
localizes the fluorescent protein, not
the target protein per se. Adding
1–2 nm (the diameter of EOSplus linker)
is straightforward, but the geometry
of the EOS relative to the rest of the
molecule is unknown. Thus, the EOS
moiety could be highly mobile or
could be ‘stuck’ at a defined
orientation relative to the amino- or
carboxy-terminal domain to which it
is attached. While a mobile EOS will
simply broaden the Gaussian
distribution for Z-axis location, a fixed
orientation could introduce a small but
systematic error. While the potential
error is small relative to the 40 nm scale
examined by Kanchanawong et al. [7],
it may not be negligible for some
applications.
This study points the way toward
approaches that are likely to transform
our understanding of multi-protein
complexes in living or fixed cells. The
ability to localize specific components
in three dimensions with 10–20 nm
resolution represents a major advance
that will catalyze progress in many
fields of cell biology. Moreover, assuper-resolution acquisition times
become faster, it will become
possible to analyze active processes.
Integrin-mediated adhesions in
particular are dynamic, force-sensitive
machines that respond to changes in
ECM composition, topography and
mechanics to determine cellular
responses [6]. But the active, dynamic
process by which cells read the
topography and mechanical properties
of the ECM are poorly understood.
A detailed analysis of the location of
specific protein domains in
adhesions during sensing would be
a huge step forward. The biology
community can look forward to
major advances in understanding these
and other complex subcellular
machines as a result of the resolution
revolution.
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Apes to BeesNew research shows that honeybees can classify arrangements of two visual
patterns according to their spatial configuration. Can bees learn relational
concepts of ‘above’ and ‘below’? And are the underlying psychological
processes comparable in humans and other primates facing similar tasks?Lars Chittka and Keith Jensen
The study of concept formation in
animals is notoriously contentious.
On the one hand, it appears at the heart
of the question of whether animals
can be capable of ‘abstract thinking’
in a human-like sense; on the other
hand, it is often difficult to rule out that
what appears to be conceptual
thinking cannot be explained by low-
level cues. Machery [1] defines the
term as follows: ‘‘A concept of x is
a body of information about x that is
stored in long-term memory and that is
used by default in the processesunderlying most, if not all, higher
cognitive competences when they
result in judgments about x’’ [1]. We
invite the reader to brainstorm for a few
moments as to what the concept of
‘dog’ entails. It is much more than
a category encompassing a huge
variety of distinct breeds with sizes
ranging from the equivalent of a cat to
a pony, with distinct colour coats and
body proportions; the concept of ‘dog’
also includes many types of semantic
information, various behaviour
patterns and ‘mentalities’, multiple
ways in which dogs can be useful to
their owners, and so on [2].Ever since Herrnstein and Loveland
[3] showed that pigeons could
discriminate novel stimuli (pictureswith
people in them as opposed to
unpopulated pictures), there has been
interest in whether animals have
concepts. The debate centres on the
question of whether what appears like
concept formation can instead be
explained by stimulus generalisation
[4,5] and discrimination by first order
perceptual features [6,7]. In one
categorisation experiment,
chimpanzees managed to sort a mix
of various different tools and food
items into separate piles — despite the
fact that exemplars within each
category had no obvious physical
resemblance to one another [8]. Had
the chimpanzees thus understood the
concept of ‘tools’ and ‘food’? It has
been pointed out that subjects could
have simply classified objects by
whether or not they induce salivation
[9]; and indeed there are many other
low-level cue explanations — after all,
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Figure 1. Stimuli sequentially shown to bees on the back wall of a Y-maze.
Bees were trained to collect sucrose solution in one of the arms of the maze. Each pair of
patterns simultaneously presented in the Y-maze contained the same visual stimuli, only
distinguished by whether the ‘target’ occurred below or above the ‘referent’, which was always
the same. Bees encountered a series of different targets during training, and were rewarded
only if they flew into the arm that contained the target below the referent (another group of
bees was rewarded if they correctly picked the arm where targets consistently appeared
above the referent). The exact positions of targets and referents on the back walls of the
arms of the Y maze were varied to ensure that bees could not learn a fixed configuration [11].
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R117food and tools differ consistently in
surface texture, angularity of shape,
softness and other features.
Nonetheless, there are convincing
demonstrations of categorisation in
many animal species, including bees,
that may not be so easily explained
by such low level processes [9,10].
To explore if animals can learn
relational concepts, such as sameness
and difference, subjects are often
tested with ‘matching-to-sample’ or
non-matching to sample paradigms.
They are shown a stimulus, and shortly
afterwards must choose between two
stimuli, one similar (or identical) and
one different to the one previously
viewed. Many vertebrates [9], and
indeed bees [10], can solve such tasks.
But impressive though they may be,
the level of ‘understanding’ of the
concept of sameness or difference
needed for passing such tests might
be fundamentally simpler than in
humans. Human subjects can
appreciate, for example, the ways in
which buses, ferries, and trains are
‘same’ (they are all means of public
transport) and in which ways they are
different. In typical matching-to-
sample tasks, it is the stimuli that are
either similar or not. At its basic level,
this involves comparing an incoming
stimulus with the contents of working
memory, and the rule of whether to
choose ‘same’ or ‘different’ must be
stored in long term memory — but it
does not necessarily require the
formation of a concept with the full
range of implications of the term in
human psychology.
Now Avargue`s-Weber et al. [11]
have performed experiments to see
if honeybees (Apis mellifera) can
conceptualise above/below
relationships. Bees were trained to
collect sucrose solution in one of two
arms of a Y-maze; if they chose the
wrong arm, they would receive quinine
solution, a strongly aversive stimulus
for bees. The arm of the maze
containing the reward changed
unpredictably from trial to trial, and the
only way bees could identify the correct
arm was by choosing the correct
arrangement of two visual stimuli on
the back walls of the Y-maze. One of
these stimuli was the ‘referent’, which
was kept constant through all trials
of each individual bee (Figure 1). The
other was the target (where the reward
was offered), but the visual appearance
of the target changed multiple times
during training. The correct arm ofthe maze could be located by a rule:
if the target was presented below the
referent, there would a sweet reward
for the bee; if the target occurred
above, a bitter punishment was in
store. (Another group of bees was
trained in the reverse way.) The bees
swiftly learnt this task, and were even
able to pass a transfer test when
presented with a completely unfamiliar
target, which, however, appeared
again in the correct location relative to
referent.
Thus, even though the same pairs
of stimuli were always presented in the
right and left arm, the bees were able
to choose the correct arrangement,so that they could not solve the task
based on the presence or absence of
the two items in each arm of the maze.
Avargue`s-Weber et al. [11] also altered
the exact positions of the two items
to discourage subjects from learning
a fixed compound of both. A trivial
explanation for the findings might be
that bees simply could not distinguish
the various targets, and therefore
treated them identically. However, the
authors ensured that the targets
presented sequentially were of
different colours and shapes, and
indeed they demonstrated empirically
that bees could discriminate them
when trained to do so. These elegant
Figure 2. A natural analogue of the above/below-ness concept for bees.
Bees might be using the shape of otherwise near-indistinguishable hillocks as a landmark (the
referent) and then pick the familiar one according to whether the area beneath (a flower
meadow) contains targets, or not. Other bees might have trained themselves to forage from
targets above the reference — in this case, trees presenting their flowers above the horizon
of a different hillock.
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do much more than just associate the
visual properties of a target with
a reward.
To understand why animals are good
at certain laboratory tasks, it often
helps to explore what the nearest
natural analogue to the experimental
setup is. Bees outperform many
species of vertebrates at colour
learning [9] presumably because
associating colours with rewards is
a fundamental part of a forager bees’
lifestyle [12]. Their remarkable ability to
solve sameness/difference tasks in
a matching-to-sample paradigm might
also be related to natural foraging
behaviour, where a strategy to win-stay
or lose-shift is employed in deciding
which flower species to visit,
depending on recent rewards [13]. In
the new experiment, let us replace the
‘referent’ with a natural landmark—say
the horizon profile of a hillock, where
there are several similar hillocks
nearby. The task for a bee to pick the
hillock with a rich flower meadow
beneath — i.e., pick the landmark, if it
has a target beneath — any target, no
matter the flower species or the exact
location (Figure 2). In nature, as in
the laboratory experiments by
Avargue`s-Weber et al. [11], the exact
location of the landmark relative to
the potential target will vary depending
on the approach angle, distance to
target, and so on. Thus, we need to
consider the possibility that bees might
solve the task by a relatively simple
algorithm: fly to the referent (the
landmark) if there is something —
anything— in the ventral visual field as
you’re approaching the referent (or the
dorsal visual field if trained to pick
stimuli above the referent). When
viewed in a naturalistic setting, thefindings of the new study by
Avargue`s-Weber et al. [11] make
beautiful biological sense.
This is one possible explanation;
another is that bees had indeed
conceptualised the relationship of
above-ness and below-ness. To
explore this possibility, it us useful to
compare the experimental procedures
that have been used in primates to test
for the existence of such concepts.
An important difference between the
new study on bees and those
conducted on baboons (Papio papio)
[14] and capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) [15] is that primates were asked
to further discriminate above and
below relationships when the referent
also changed. Both capuchins and
baboons succeeded (excluding the
possibility that the referent is simply
used as a ‘landmark’), but bees remain
to be tested. A striking difference
observed in those tests that were more
directly comparable, though, was that
it took the primates several hundreds
or indeed thousands of trials to master
similar tasks, whereas the bees took
only a few dozen. Human infants at
three months of age fail altogether to
show a concept of above and below
unless the targets remain the same
[16], though by the time they are
6 months old, infants perform
comparably to bees and monkeys [17].
But while the tasks are seemingly
similar, are these performances indeed
comparable? Bees were allowed to
move freely to and from the apparatus
and could thus solve the tasks in
a manner equivalent to a spatial
navigation task, and motivation
remains high in forager bees since they
forage for the colony and thus never
satiate. Primates were tested in highly
non-biological settings— the baboons,for example, had tomanipulate a cursor
onto a fixation point using a joystick,
no doubt a challenging task in itself.
For infants, there was no reward or
punishment whatsoever; instead
performance was assessed via looking
times depending on the apparent
novelty in the stimuli. Thus, while the
tasks themselves might be roughly
comparable, there were profound
differences in how subjects could go
about solving them, and presumably
in motivation. And even if all these
differences were eliminated, it would
be hard to determine the exact strategy
by which subjects solved the task,
and indeed there might even be inter-
individual differences with respect to
the underlying strategy: even if
performance is the same, some
individuals might solve a task using
relatively simple heuristics while others
might use a more abstract reasoning.
A broader question is whether the
performance of bees and primates
(including infants) qualifies for concept
formation in a stricter sense. While
learnt rules of same/different, above/
below, more/less relationships are
crucial ingredients of concepts,
are such rules themselves concepts?
As pointed out above, a sameness/
difference judgment can take on very
different levels of complexity, and the
same is true for above/below
relationships. Once humans have
understood the concept of this
relationship, they can appreciate the
ways in which the sky is above them,
the king is above the knight, the way
in which ‘above/below’ relates to
‘better/worse’, and so on. Transfer of
relational rules across domains or to
novel situations is rarely explored in
animal studies (but see [10]) — for
example, would bees transfer their
learnt preference for target above
a reference to the higher of two
flowering species in their natural
three-dimensional environment?
Because of the proximity of the term
‘concept’ to ‘abstract thinking’, we
must be careful not to conclude too
swiftly that fulfilling basic prerequisites
of concept formation is indicative of
the full range of cognitive phenomena
that come with conceptual thinking in
humans [5]. Similar behavioural
performances by different animals,
and the fact that current definitions
permit application to a range of
species’ abilities, don’t necessarily
mean that the underlying processes
are similar (or similarly complex).
Dispatch
R119There might be differences in how apes
(including humans) and monkeys form
concepts [18], and other animals,
including bees, could use yet other
solutions towards similar behavioural
problems.
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E-mail: l.chittka@qmul.ac.ukDOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2010.12.045Cytokinesis: Thinking Outside the CellHowmight the extracellular matrix contribute to cytokinesis? In a recent report,
evidence is presented that the conserved extracellular matrix protein
hemicentinHIM-4 is required for cytokinesis in worms and mice.Shawn N. Jordan1, Sara Olson2,
and Julie C. Canman1,*
The extracellular matrix (ECM)
functions akin to a cellular exoskeleton,
providing structural support and sites
of attachment for the cells it surrounds.
However, the ECM is much more than
just a scaffold. With established roles in
cell migration, tissue separation, and
cell signal transduction [1], the ECM is
clearly a dynamic player in many
cellular functions.
Cytokinesis is the physical division
of one cell into two daughter cells that
occurs at the end of the cell cycle.
Cytokinesis is accomplished by
constriction of a contractile ring
composed of filamentous actin and the
motor myosin-II (together actomyosin)
[2]. In order to divide, a cell must recruit
and coordinate a host of regulatory and
structural proteins to the division plane,
but existing models of cytokinesis do
not consider a contribution from
secreted extracellular proteins.
The secreted ECM protein
hemicentin (HMCN1 or fibulin-6 in
Homo sapiens, HIM-4 in
Caenorhabditis elegans) is of particular
interest as it may have an evolutionarilyconserved role in cytokinesis.
Hemicentin is a relative of a multigene
family of proteins called fibulins,
secreted proteins that assimilate into
the ECM and form higher order
structures, such as elastic fibers [3].
The hemicentin protein contains
a single, highly conserved von
Willebrand A domain, a long stretch
of immunoglobulin repeats, epidermal
growth factor domains, and
a fibulin-like carboxy-terminal module
[4]. In the roundworm C. elegans,
hemicentinHIM-4 has been found in
cell-matrix adhesion sites known
as hemidesmosomes and at multiple
connecting junctions throughout the
body [5]. Cells surrounding the
hermaphroditic worm gonad also
secrete hemicentinHIM-4, and functional
disruption of the him-4 locus in
C. elegans leads to a high incidence
of males due to defects in segregation
of the X chromosome, resulting in XO
male progeny [6]. The him-4 mutants
also display pleiotropic defects in
motility, adhesion, behavior, and gonad
morphology [5].
In a paper published in a recent issue
of Current Biology, Xu and Vogel [7]
took a closer look at the gonadmorphology defects in him-4 mutants.
In the C. elegans gonad, germ cells
form as part of a syncytium, with
incomplete cytokinetic furrows
partitioning single nuclei that share
a common cytoplasm [8]. These nuclei
are eventually segregated completely
as the cell matures into an oocyte and
physically separates from the
syncytium [8]. HemicentinHIM-4 labeled
with green fluorescent protein
localized in a ring structure at the base
of these incomplete furrows in the
gonad. In the absence of
hemicentinHIM-4, the gonad in aged
worms becamedisorganized due to the
formation of multinucleated germ cells.
Temporal analysis revealed that while
nascent membrane partitions
appeared to have a normal structure,
they soon became destabilized and
eventually collapsed.
The recruitment of hemicentinHIM-4 to
the tips of the membrane partitions in
the C. elegans gonad was dependent
on the highly conserved Rho family
guanine nucleotide exchange factor
(GEF) ECT-2. During cytokinesis, ECT-2
activates Rho and initiates assembly of
the actomyosin ring at the constriction
site [2]. In an ECT-2-deficient
background, the majority of
hemicentinHIM-4 remained in the
pseudo-coelomic fluid outside of the
gonad. Taken together, these results
suggest a role for hemicentinHIM-4 in
maintaining the cytokinetic membrane
partitions in older worms, and that its
